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Recent Trend
A new trend arises that more and more physicists
are attracted to economy-related problems. This is evi-
denced by the growing numbers of publications in physics
journals devoted to theoretical and applied issues in
economics and finance, fresh Ph.D’s and seasoned re-
searchers alike find career on Wall Street, and new jour-
nals are launched and conferences are organized etc.
Trespassing on others’ domain is notorious for physicists:
their insatiable curiosity steadily pushes them into their
near and far neighbors like biology, economics and other
natural and social disciplines.
However, the current predilection seems to be in econ-
omy, especially in finance. Probably one can recognize
two categories of interest: 1) physicists’ tools are much
in demand and the so-called ”technical analysis” is more
and more complex and often an experienced physicist can
offer the much needed skills that traditionally trained
economists lack; 2) research topics present fundamental,
intellectual challenges, the aim is to understand the ba-
sic mechanism. In this essay we shall concentrate on this
second category. Moreover, we shall limit ourselves to
modeling market mechanism.
Why Interesting?
To appreciate why economy is interesting for physi-
cists and what challenge is left there one has to know
what is the current accepted theory in that field. We
must not pretend to summarize the state of art here,
a critical appraisal can be found in a recent Santa Fe
Proceedings [1]. If we look into the literature, as a physi-
cist one may get the strange feeling that the Theory is
so detached from the Experiments. On the one hand the
Theory is extremely refined and self-consistent with little
effort to compare with empirical evidence; on the other
the experiments (e.g. traders’ activities) are also exten-
sively performed with little reference to the Theory. It
is revealing to see how Soros, one of the top players in
finance considers the Theory [2]. In short, current pre-
vailing theory assumes equilibrium, the descriptions are
mostly static. Little is said how an equilibrium can be
attained, if attainable at all. One get impression that the
Theory looks like ”mean field” theory in physics, balanc-
ing actions and reactions. Dynamics of markets can be
found nowhere. Meanwhile, Insight gained in the statis-
tical mechanics, especially in non-equilibrium processes,
may inspire physicists to have a try in formulating a sort
of dynamical theory for some economical processes.
Experimental activities in finance are highly devel-
oped, much data (e.g. crashes) defy explanation. One
is tempted to compare the current state of affairs to
the thermodynamics before Boltzmann or even Carnot,
where the framework is yet to be established. One does
not know how to put together pieces of empirical law into
a coherent picture. Let us not entertain this comparison
too far, since economy provides less precise data and the
fundamental elements are thinking agents versus the obe-
dient particles in thermodynamics. One can never hope
to get a future economy theory as quantitative and pre-
dictive as physical laws. However, this should not deter
us from searching a framework to understand some basic
phenomena qualitatively. In short, any relevant theory
should remain in ”soft science”, we should keep this in
mind when modeling economy.
Studying economy related problems can give certainly
valuable feedback for physics proper. Barring the risk
of offending our colleagues, we might say that current
statistical mechanics research is somewhat stagnant, re-
spect to its exciting days in the 70’s and 80’s. Economy
presents new challenges, new problems and new ways of
thinking, can teach us some new secrets of how Nature
works in this ”soft” science discipline.
How to Put Hands on?
Lacking a general framework, one has to search models
in the dark, thus various models by physicists appeared
in the literature. To start one needs a concrete model.
Before present our own model let us recall that our aim
has to be very modest, the best one can have is a sort of
paradigm. One has also to keep the model as simple as
possible, in order to say something general. One has here
in mind the Ising Model, despite its oversimplification,
still offers insight into real magnetism; or the BTW Self-
Organized Criticality Model [3], supposedly applies only
to ideal sand piles, but offer insight into many natural
phenomena. Let us list a minimal set of ingredients that
are indispensable for modeling markets.
1) A large number of independent agents participate
in a market.
2) Each agent has some alternatives in making his de-
cision.
3) The aggregate activity results in a market price,
which is known to all.
4) Agents use the public price history to make their
decisions.
This set of ingredients is quite arbitrary, we omit no-
tably two important factors: a) no fundamental news in
the market besides their own trading activity; b) agents
do not believe in any theory, they only learn from their
own experience and believe, that the price history con-
tains information. We want to study the inherent dy-
namics of market, in the absence of external influences.
Real economy has both internal and external contributes.
B. Arthur has advocated the so-called ”inductive think-
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ing” approach [4], which represents a minority opinion
in economics. His idea is that since an agent cannot use
the Theory to deduct his decision, his only choice is to
learn from his own experience, as many a trader would
attest. Our own model is inspired from Arthur’s El Farol
problem [4]. Below we shall illustrate our ideas through
two models. The first Competition Model is intended
to reveal the rich intrinsic market dynamics and general
issues; the second Trading Model is to apply the basic
ideas to an artificial market.
The Minority Model
The simplest model we can think of is defined in a
form of evolutionary game. Let us consider a population
of N (odd) players. At each time step, everybody has
to choose to be on side A or B. The payoff of the game
is that after everybody has chosen side independently,
those who are in the minority side win. In the simplest
version, all winners collect a point. The players make
decisions based on the common knowledge of the past
record. The past record only tells which side is winner,
without the actual attendance number. Thus the time
series can be represented by a binary sequence, 1 or 0
meaning A or B is the winning side.
Let us assume that our players are quite limited in
their analyzing power, they can only retain last M bits
of the system’s signal and make their next decision basing
only on these M bits. Each player has a finite set S of
strategies. A strategy is defined to be the next action (to
be in A,B, or 1,0), given a specific signal’s M bits. The
example of one strategy is illustrated in table 1 for M=3.
record decision
000 1
001 0
010 0
011 1
100 1
101 0
110 1
111 0
There are 8 (= 2M ) bits we can assign to the right side.
Each configuration corresponds a distinct strategy, this
makes the total number of strategies to be 22
M
= 256.
This is indeed a fast increasing number, for M = 2, 3,
4, 5 it is 16, 256, 65536, 655362. We randomly draw
S strategies for each player, from the pool. All the S
strategies in a player’s bag can collect points depending
if they would win or not given the M past bits, and the
actual outcome of the next play. However, these are only
virtual points as they record the merit of a strategy as
if it were used each time. The player uses the strategy
having the highest accumulated points for his action, he
gets a real point only if the strategy used happens to win
in the next play. The fact of using alternative strategies
makes the players adaptive to the market. A player thus
tends to maximize his capital (cumulated points) and his
performance is judged only on his time averaged capital
gain.
Several remarks are in order. By the very definition of
minority agents are not encouraged to form commonly-
agreed views on the market. This is like in real markets
bears and bulls live together. In real trading it is of-
ten observed that a minority of traders get into a trend
(buying or selling) first, the majority get finally dragged
in also. When the minority anticipates correctly and get
out of the trend in time, they pocket the profit at the ex-
pense of the majority. There is limited resource available
for competition. If the players manage to coordinate well,
per play they can expect (N − 1)/2 points, the maximal
gain possible. Since our players are selfish, no explicit
coordination is imposed, their fate is left to the market.
The important question is if they can somehow learn to
spontaneously cooperate. S = 1 simplifies further the
model in which instead of players the strategies compete
directly. The outcome is trivial deterministic signal. It
is the extra layer of complexity at the player’s level en-
sures adaptability. (Remember the role of hidden layers
in Neural Network?)
This binary model is very suitable for numerical exper-
iments. Damien Challet, a graduate student at Fribourg,
implemented the game on a computer. The preliminary
results are reported in [5]. Note the word ”experiment”
instead of ”simulation” is used. This is to emphasize
that we did not have precise goals at the start, like in
an exploratory experiment, the players are let loose to
play and we observe. We were rather amazed with the
complex, rich consequences of the model.
The parameters of the model are just three: N,M,S.
However, there hidden parameters. The space of the
strategies is most intriguing. Apparently this space is
so huge, that for realistic parameter values say M = 10,
this space should be regarded as infinite (22
M
> 10300)
for all practical purposes. Numerical experiments show
that the space is far from infinite. Depending on N the
market has distinct behavior, M = 10 can be too large
or too small for achieving coordination. How can such
large number (10300) still be relevant in this model? A
more refined analysis of the strategy space can solve this
paradox of large number.
Boolean ”Genetic” Space
It is instructive to represent the strategy space on a
2M dimensional Boolean hypercube. The Ntot = 2
2
M
distinct strategies are on the points of the hypercube.
There is a striking similarity with Kauffman’s Boolean
NK network [6]. Consider two neighboring strategies
which differ only by one bit, in other words the Ham-
ming distance between them is one. These two strate-
gies predict almost always the same outcome acting on
the past record: out of 2M possibilities only one excep-
tion. Therefore the distinct strategies are highly corre-
lated. Players using correlated strategies tend to obtain
the same decision, thus hindering their chance finding the
minority side. Among the Ntot strategies there is huge
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redundancy. If two strategies are uncorrelated, their de-
cision outcomes should match with 1/2 probability. This
is possible if their Hamming distance is 1/2 of the max-
imal value (2M ). We are thus led to count mutually
uncorrelated strategies. This count will provide a cru-
cial measure of diversity (or independence) of the Ntot
strategies.
We recall some useful basic properties of a hyper-
cube: There is a subset of 2M pairs of points (out of
Ntot, within every pair the Hamming distance is maximal
(2M ). They are anti-correlation pairs in the sense two
strategies of a pair always predict the opposite actions.
All other Hamming distances among these N0 = 2
M+1
points are 2M−1, i.e. mutually independent. In other
words these N0 points are composed of two groups of 2
M
points each. Within the group the strategies are com-
pletely independent. Some of the cross-group links can
be anti-correlated.
It is this reduced number N0 which plays an impor-
tant role in the model. If the number of strategies in the
population NS is larger than N0, then the players have
to use strategies which are positively correlated, the herd
effect is unavoidable despite the adaptability of our play-
ers. The herd effect will result in fluctuations larger than
random chance would warrant, thus leads to waste of the
limited resources.On the other hand, if NS << N0, the
”independent” subset of strategies indeed appears to be
independent. NS cannot sample enough the N0 strate-
gies, the anti-correlation Hamming distances can hardly
be represented (correction being about NS/N0). The
players in this case will appear as if they were using ran-
dom strategy, independent from each other. Most in-
teresting is the critical case when NS ∼ N0, i.e. when
the reduced set is more or less covered by the population.
The majority of their mutual Hamming distances implies
independence, but a small part (about square-root of the
total) implies anti-correlation. This means that the play-
ers behave almost independently, the small number of
anti-correlation Hamming distances help them to obtain
opposite decisions. This is beneficial for everybody since
coordinated avoidance makes the players more evenly dis-
tributed on the two sides, the limited resource is better
exploited. Therefore there are three distinct phases: 1)
the overcrowded phase NS > N0 where positive correla-
tion is inevitable, the herd effect makes it worse for every-
body; 2) a cooperation or critical region NS ∼ N0 where
the strategies used by N players are mostly independent,
plus some anti-correlation links to achieve mutual avoid-
ance, the resource is better shared; 3) a random region
NS << N0 where the anti-correlation is hardly present,
strategies appear to be independent. A recent numeri-
cal study [7] is in qualitative agreement with the above
analytical result.
Darwinism and Evolution towards cooperation
Between the over-competitive and random phases lies
the critical region NS ∼ N0 where cooperation emerges.
This reminds us of Kauffman’s often quoted motto
”adaptation toward the edge of chaos”. The competing
population has different phases of collective behavior, de-
pending on the choice of N,M,S. We see from the above
discussion that adaptation puts an evolutionary pressure
on the players’ strategies, they tend to be as diversified
as possible. In the NS > N0 region, this pressure (or
tendency) is frustrated since the strategy space (the hy-
percube) is too crowded. To relieve this pressure, one
may want to change S or M for fixed N . Changing S
is not very efficient. Increasing M is highly effective be-
cause of the exponential dependence.
We would like to let the population to evolve to this co-
operative region without imposing the fixed parameters.
To this end we introduce another level of adaptation by
adding the Darwinism to this competition game. Worst
player is periodically wed out of the game; best player
is allowed to produce an offspring. The new born player
is a clone copy of his parent with the virtual capital re-
set to zero. A small mutation rate is assumed to ensure
genetic diversity, i.e. one of his inherited strategies is
replaced. The total population is kept constant without
loss of generality. The newly drawn strategy can have
its M changed by one unit. This permits the players
to find the best suitable M . The population can never-
theless reach a stationary state, clearly now with inho-
mogeneous M . In short, the population is able to evolve
without outside intervention and self-organize themselves
to find the critical region NS ∼ N0, where it is beneficial
for everybody.[5]
Another interesting variant is to let the strategies fight
directly, without players as intermediary (S = 1). In or-
der to have nontrivial dynamics going on, we allow a large
number (N1) of randomly drawn strategies to participate
the game passively, only a small number of strategies of
the total Na << N1 actively play. The passive strate-
gies observe the system’s posting board and count their
virtual gain, i.e. as if they took part in the game. If
one strategy’s simulated gain is above a certain thresh-
old, say any benchmark average in the actual game, he
is bullish enough to come to the fore by becoming an
active strategy. The worst strategies recede to the sta-
tus of passive observers. Each strategy has two balance
sheets, one for the cumulated real gain during his ac-
tive playing periods; another for simulated gain counted
from the last time he is relegated to the observer pool.
In this variant the Darwinism evolutionary pressure is
also operative. Positively correlated strategies do well as
observers, but do poorly in actual play. Therefore their
active appearance is bound to be brief. Most interesting
is to let the number of active strategies Na free, every-
one is allowed to actively play, the market should decide
how many actually do. Clearly inhomogeneous M is bet-
ter and mutation should also be operative in order to
keep an adequate diversity. The system in a way is like
a grand-canonical ensemble. A large pool of observers
is also a realistic feature of markets. Many an investor
figures out his chances by simulation, he is attracted to
markets if he believes that he has an edge. But often the
subsequent participation can be disappointing.
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A Prototype Trading Model
The minority model, though very rich, still lacks some
most basic features in a real market, e.g. the price which
is determined by the aggregate supply and demand. We
want to keep the above general ingredients, to build a
more specific trading model. In a trading model players
have to decide when to buy and sell, just like to take
A and B side in the minority model. However the pay-
off is not a fixed rule, but depends on the price move-
ment which is in turn determined by the players’ trading.
In the modern market of stocks, currencies, and com-
modities, trading patterns are becoming more and more
global. Market-moving information is available to every-
body. However, not all the participants interpret the in-
formation the same way and react at the same time delay.
In fact, every participant has a certain fixed framework
facing external events. It is well known that the global
market is far from being at equilibrium [1], the collec-
tive behavior of the market can occasionally have violent
bursts.
Let us define our model more precisely. Each player is
initially given the same amount of capital in two forms:
cash and stock. There is only one stock in this model. All
trading consists of switching back and forth between cash
and this stock. Each player has a strategy that makes
recommendation for buying or selling a certain amount
of stock for the next time step. This depends solely on
the price history. Player i’s strategy is an arbitrary non-
linear function Fi(pt, pt−1, . . .), positive (negative) values
recommend the amount of buying (selling). The aggre-
gate trading decides the next price tick pt+1, using the
law of supply-demand. Darwinism is also implemented
here.
Our numerical simulations are quite encouraging [8].
Despite the simplicity and the arbitrariness of the strate-
gies, an extremely rich price history is created. A sam-
ple of pt is shown in fig.1, which shows fluctuations of
all sizes. Depending on the parameters, on long runs,
also some crushes occasionally occur, with no warning.
New features appear here respect to the minority model:
Even though the same self-organized structure is used
here, the system does not appear to reach equilibrium,
one can hardly limit the range of the price fluctuations.
This is due to partly the continuous strategy space, as
well as the law of supply-demand.
Open Questions and Perspectives
We have discussed two models of self-organized sys-
tems, in which players compete in a common market
place using the signal produced by their own activities.
We argue that this general scenario should be also present
in real markets. As in an early stage of any emergent sci-
ence discipline (some already baptized ”econophysics”),
many different models are proposed. We feel the current
need is learn how to ask the right questions about eco-
nomical processes. By asking right questions and try-
ing to answer them, we have to explore many seem-
ingly isolated models, empirical laws etc to be able to
set up a workable framework. Already at the level of
simplest minority model, we see that many interdisci-
plinary subjects have naturally been related to. Let us
indulge ourselves with an arbitrary list: self-organized
criticality, population and Darwinism, ecology, informa-
tion science (auto-feeding signals should be analyzed a
la Shannon), glasses and spin-glasses (frustrations, non-
ergodicity), Kauffman’s NK model and auto-catalysis,
game theory (Prisoner’s dilemma pits two players to com-
pete, the minority game can be a natural generalization)
etc. Many of these relations deserve further study. Be-
sides some relevance to economy, continuing this exercise
of model building and playing is certainly rewarding.
Acknowledgments: I thank D. Challet, G. Caldarelli
and M. Marsili for their fruitful collaboration.
Figure Caption: Price history is the artificial trading
model. Self-similarity seems to suggest some scaling in-
variance, in fact the statistical properties is in reasonable
agreement with real market data [8].
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